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Null Hypothesis
- To: Robert Mcgrath <mcgrath_mcnally@xxxxxxx>
 
- Subject: Null Hypothesis
 
- From: Nicholas Bernstein <nicholas.bernstein@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
 
- Date: Fri, 16 Apr 2004 11:08:13 -0600
 
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Bob,
I think you've hit upon a very trenchant issue.  I would repose it like 
this, "In looking at electronic voting systems, who has the burden of 
proof? Is it up to proponents of electronic voting to prove the 
superiority of electronic systems, or the detractors to prove the 
fallibility?"
Proponents say, "Just look at Florida in 2000. Paper doesn't work!"
Detractors say, "Just look at the security holes in Deibold machines. 
Electronics can't be trusted!"
I would claim that they are both right.  Neither method should be 
trusted based solely on the failures of the other. The only way to 
reliablilty compare the two is to have them go head-to-head. And the 
only way to do this is with a paper printout.
Call it a "ballot" or a "receipt". The difference is moot. Until one 
system has proven its superiority over the other, there should be a 
complete count of paper and electronic ballots. If a unique ballot ID 
can link the two, anomolies can be investigated on a case by case basis. 
There are those people who are afraid of such a head-to-head comparisons 
because they worry that the electronic count will trump the paper one. I 
think the question of which method should be trusted in case of 
anomolies is minor compared to coming up with a measure of the relative 
accuracy. If we get nothing else, we learn that there is an x% 
discrepancy rate. That, in itself, is very valuable.
If we really want to unambiguously resolve discrepancies, then we need a 
method for letting the voters themselves resolve them. I have proposed 
variations on this theme before, but here is another try. At the voting 
place, a SECOND RECEIPT is printed that contains ONLY THE UNIQUE ID.  
The user can  take that home. Discrepant ballot IDs are posted. If your 
ballot is one of those in question, your second receipt provides you 
admission to a session where you can cast a clarification ballot. 
Obviously there are many details to work out, but this system would 
maintain anonymity, guard against miscounts, and let voters know when 
their ballot has been invalidated.
Nick
--
If you're not outraged, you're not paying attention.