Sections for the Report - April 8th, 2005

Election Review Committee Boulder County, Colorado Sections for the Draft Report 4-8-05

INTRODUCTION Dick Lyons

Election fiasco in Florida 2000 election (new) Heightened awareness First use of new and unfamiliar counting system

EXTERNAL FACTORS BEYOND CONTROL OF COUNTY CLERK Narrative Paul recommendation Paul

• Constantly changing rules from Colorado Secretary of State (18)
• Court cases (28)
• State statutes not efficient for technology (new) for example: lack of legal authority to conduct statistical audits absent authorization from SOS
• Voter responsibility to express their intent according to rules (OF 2)
• Some new ballot counting system required to be purchased because of previous (DataVote) system needed expensive repair. (OF 16)

PLANNING, STAFFING, AND EDUCATION Narrative Recommendation- Linda

• Processing of provisional ballots (12)
• Mail and absentee ballot verification (13)
• Implementing Help American Vote Act (HAVA) (20)
• Local partisan debate over implementation of new rules (OF 5 and OF 13)
• Human resources: possible inadequate staffing and training of both temporary and permanent staff (2)
• Need election boss to run election and answer questions
• Need adequate staff at headquarters to answer phoned questions from precincts
• Training and qualification of election workers (19)
• Recruitment of temporary workers (22)
• Successful polling location selection for accessibility, secure, and properly run (OF 14)
• Lack of an integrated quality management system (OF 15)
• Lack of efficient logic and accuracy test procedures
• Lack of good contract review
• Lack of printing specifications
• Lack of good procurement practices
• Lack of process controls, e.g., certified operators
• Lack of backup crisis management plan (9)
• Need to work better with parties to get volunteers
• Inadequate voter education and instruction
• How to fill out ballots and ballot marking device (32)
• How to register
• What is a provisional ballot

PHYSICAL FACILITIES Narrative Recommendations Hillary

• Lack of large enough space for counting and polling places
• Lack of privacy shields in polling places
• Insufficiently quiet space for counting
• Lack of control of entry into counting space
• Inadequate control of ballot security during processing
• Lack of separate facilities for resolution

HART Ballot Now system Narrative- Dick Harris Recommendation- DONE

• Large 11 x 17 ballots may have contributed to misplacement of voting boxes (26)
• Recommendation by HART
• Difficult for election workers to handle
• Difficult to put into ballot box without revealing votes
• Pages often got out of order when inserting into ballot box
• Difficult for election workers to put in correct order
• Post-election HART specifications suggested a preference for smaller ballot
• Perhaps insufficient registration marks in ballot design
• HART software required multiple pages of a single ballot to be in sequence (HART’s interpretation of HAVA?)
• HART software not robust
• User friendliness needs improvement
• Many unnecessary operator motions required that can be eliminated by software improvements
• Some window box labels explaining resolution issue are not visible without expanding boxes
• Damaged ballot required a minimum of 72 motions to resolve a race (check this fact)
• Write-in votes had to be resolved at central counting center
• 100% of ballots were resolved during the counting process
• HART system as currently configured is slow
• Did not educate public on expectation for counting time
• HART estimates with present configuration, and optimal conditions, for an election of this magnitude, counting time will be 24 to 28 hours (Checking on this statement)
• HART systems, ballot on demand (early voting), allows for inadvertent multiple duplicate ballots with the same serial number

PRINTING Narrative Michael, Recommendation Tom

• Ballot Printing Anomaly (6)
• Lack of formalized procurement process
• Lack of specs both Hart and County
• Sub contracting disclosed, expected
• Contract
• Speed vs quality- Boulder County met statutory deadlines (only county in State)
• Lack of quality control by printers
• HART saying no to printing, Train wreck coming
• Inadequate lead-time
• Obvious substandard printing on some ballots
• Barcodes- stretched, undertone and/or blurred
• Overtone of general ballot
• Only half of ballot printed on page
• Questionable security on serial numbers
• Improperly labeled ballot packages
• Improper Paper Conditioning offered as a possible, but unlikely explanation
• Duplicate serial numbers on Absentee ballots
• Large Ballot Size
• Effects paper movement during printing and scanning
• Increases the difficulty of locating the voting box on ballot
• Delays at polling location
• Handling the ballots to count
• Potentially corrupted PDF files, was the printing system properly initialized before printing run

DRAFT RECOMMENDATIONS:

Perform staffing analysis and skills analysis Certification of all election workers Lack of identification of key roles and skill sets required Have integrated (not 2) voter lists Add a voter election judge dedicated phone lines Electronic poll book Study additional space needs and acquire for next large election Should auto-resolve over votes?! Ability to create custom reports by Hart system including, but not limited to, statistical audits Make the HART software fail safe

Windows would automatically close after printing ballot

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