"We've had these electronic voting machines for several years now and we've never had a problem. Why are people concerned now?"
"How do you know there haven't been problems? The job of verification shouldn't belong to the company; it should belong to election officials and voters."
Isn't the existing NASED certification program good enough to verify the vendor's election systems?
The certification did not catch the many problems identified by the Johns Hopkins researchers and SAIC, and the NASED reports, like the technology, are not available for public inspection.
Who are the members of the citizen's commission advising Boulder County's Clerk?
What specific requirements, incentives and deadlines are facing Boulder County from the federal and state legislation?
How much money is to be spent? How much of that is county funding?
About five million dollars was budgeted and set aside.
Given the concerns and controversy, would it be prudent to wait before spending large sums of taxpayer money?
What is the role of NIST in setting standards for election systems? Would the Boulder Labs be involved, and, if so, what are local experts saying about all this?
Some computer professionals suggest open source code for the voting machine software (and perhaps the operating system). Is it practical to think that so much source code could be sufficiently scrutinized by volunteer talent?
Source code is already available to "insiders", so there is always risk. The more open, the more scrutiny. Official scrutiny of the Diebold software demonstrably missed many major flaws.
We're not the first people in the country or world with concerns about electronic voting. What are other counties, states, and countries doing? What important questions are they asking?
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Jefferson County: county-wide ES&S Touch Screens, modems
